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IN PURSUIT OF 1 SRI LANKA: LESSONS FROM A MALAYSIAN 
COUNTERPART1
Salma Yusuf2  
University of Colombo 
Abstract:  
The quest for national unity has become a leadership challenge for successive leaders of both Malaysia and Sri Lanka. While 
the two countries record significant differences in contexts and background, the similarities are equally striking. The following 
is an article that is based on a two-country study undertaken by the author to unpackage and explore the "1Malaysia" 
Programme that was launched in 2009 following the election of Malaysian Prime Minister’s, Tun Najib Razak into his first 
term in office. The author spent a two week resident attachment at the 1Malayisa Foundation in Malaysia in the summer of 
2012 to study further the facets of the governance programme that had been formulated with the intention of resolving the 
ethnic tensions that have plagued Malaysia since it gained independence, or Merdeka. The purpose of the endeavour was 
three-fold: First, to identify and extract aspects of the 1Malaysia Programme as relevant to the Sri Lankan context so as to 
formulate a potential 1Sri Lanka programme that is cognizant of the variables at stake. Secondly, the article seeks to critique 
the already existent framework of the 1Malaysia Programme by providing recommendations for improvement where 
necessary. Third, to begin dialogue and deliberations on the rich learning and exchange that can be cultivated between the two 
countries by providing a framework for bilateral cooperation between the Governments of Malaysia and Sri Lanka. 
Keywords: Programme "1 Malaysia", Malaysia, Sri Lanka, Ethnic Conflict. 
  
Resumen: 
La búsqueda de la unidad nacional se ha convertido en un desafío para el liderazgo de sucesivos gobernantes tanto en Malasia 
como en Sri Lanka. Mientras ambos países presentan notables diferencias tanto en sus contextos como en sus orígenes 
históricos, existen igualmente grandes parecidos. Lo que sigue es un artículo basado en el estudio de dos países llevado a cabo 
por el autor con el fin de analizar y explorar el Programa "1 Malasia" lanzado en el 2009 tras la elección del primer ministro 
de Malasia, Tun Najib Razak durante su primer mandato. La autora pasó dos semanas en la Fundación "1 Malasia" en 
Malasia durante el verano del 2012 para estudiar las facetas del programa que había sido formulado con la intención de 
resolver las tensiones étnicas que llevan afectando a Malasia desde su acceso a la independencia (Merdeka). El propósito de 
esta búsqueda es triple: primero, identificar y extraer aquellos aspectos del Programa "1 Malasia" relevantes para el contexto 
de Sri Lanka para poder así formular un potencial Programa "1 Sri Lanka" que tenga en cuenta las variables en juego. 
Segundo, el artículo busca criticar el marco ya existente del Programa "1 Malasia" ofreciendo recomendaciones para las 
mejoras pertinentes. Tercero, iniciar un diálogo y deliberaciones sobre el rico aprendizaje y el intercambio que se pueden 
cultivar entre los dos países ofreciendo un marco para la cooperación bilateral entre los gobiernos de Malasia y Sri Lanka.
Palabras clave: Programa "1 Malasia", Malasia, Sri Lanka, conflicto étnico. 
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I. MALAYSIA
1. The Context
Upon ascending to Malaysia’s highest public office in April 2009, the Prime Minister of 
Malaysia, Dato’ Sri Najib Tun Razak introduced a vision that he hoped would bring about 
inter-ethnic harmony and national unity to his country, once and for all.3 It is not the only, but 
definitely the latest, expression of resolve by the Malaysian government to foster peaceful 
ethnic relations between the communities living in the country since it gained independence 
from British colonial rule. It also serves as an unwitting acknowledgement of the necessity for 
inter-ethnic amity that has thus far eluded the country.4
The "1 Malaysia concept",5 as it is called, espouses a culture of excellence, 
perseverance, acceptance, education, integrity, meritocracy, humility and loyalty.6 It also 
encompasses National Key Results Areas (NKRIs) and Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) on 
six major issues. 7
Since independence, national unity has been made top priority involving unity in 
education, culture, socio-economy, political and regional affairs. "1 Malaysia" seeks to 
improve the relations of all Malaysians, regardless of racial, religious or cultural 
backgrounds.8  
Despite the commitment to foster ethnic harmony between communities since 
Independence, there remain certain major concerns that need to be addressed in order to 
seriously engage the "1 Malaysia concept". Without addressing the major concerns, all efforts 
towards national unity will be in vain. 9
The "1 Malaysia concept" essentially unveiled the guiding principle to build a united 
and progressive nation, and to inculcate the spirit and values of togetherness and sense of 
belonging, regardless of race, religion and creed.10 A caveat however is that "1 Malaysia" 
does not seek to abrogate affirmative action and privileges granted to the Malay and 
Bhumiputra communities; rather it looks to improve implementation of such policies in a fair 
manner and to keep intact the spirit of 1955-1957 which has been agreed upon during the 
drafting of the Malaysian Federal Constitution on the eve of Independence. Being a concept 
                                                          
3
 Wong, Steven C.M.: “Avoid the paths of mutual recrimination, Higher Ground: It is essential to depersonalize 
politics”, New Straits Times, 22 May 2012. 
4
 Kessler, C.S. (2008): ‘Islam, the State and Desecularization: The Islamist Trajectory During the Badawi 
Years’, in Noraini, Othman; Puthucheary, M.C. and C.S. Kessler (2008): Sharing the Nation: Faith, Difference, 
Power and the State 50 years after Merdeka. Petaling Jaya, Strategic Information and Research Development 
Centre. 
5
 Mohamed Salleh, Hasnul: "1Malaysia – Concept and Values", at 
http://www.kettha.gov.my/sites/default/files/uploads/1Malaysia%20-%20Concept%20and%20Values.pdf. 
6 Ibid. 
7
 Rosli, Firdaos and Ning, Hwa En: "Working Group Meeting on “Sharing the Experiences of Inclusive Growth 
– Malaysia’s perspective”, Co-Chaired by NEAT Singapore and NEAT Indonesia, Network of East Asian Think-
Tanks (NEAT), 28 June 2012. 
8
 Muzaffar, Chandra: "1 Malaysia: The twin challenges", 1 Malaysia Foundation. 
9
 Reid, Anthony: Understanding Melayu (Malay) as a Source of Diverse Modern Identities, Journal of Southeast 
Asian Studies, vol. 32, no. 3, (October 2001), pp 295-313.  
10
 Aziz, T.A. (2009): "1Malaysia: A Blurred Vision", Transparency for a Democratic Malaysia. 2 May 2009, at 
http://tunku-aziz.org/2009/05/02/1-malaysia-a-blurred-vision/. 
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of national governance, "1 Malaysia" becomes relevant not only to the ruling elite but also to 
the people of the country.11
2. The Background
Prior to the 1970s, Malays were deemed rural in lifestyle as well as livelihood. The Chinese 
were seen as the tycoons, pillaging away the rich bounty of the land. The Indians were 
restricted to thrive between the shades of rubber trees.12
Needless to say, the aforementioned segregations and economic disparity was a recipe 
for doom. In 1969, the infamous bloody riot of May 13 occurred. This was the ultimate 
display of intolerance and was sadly and eternally recorded in the annals of the country’s 
history. The tragic event of May 13 had made the government of the day realize that the 
matter of racial harmony ought to be the foremost of all priorities. 13
Accordingly, respective measures were drawn up so as to find an equilibrium which 
would work for all communities. For instance, the New Economic Policy (NEP) was 
introduced as a means to tackle the great economic disparity between races in Malaysia and to 
eradicate poverty regardless of race.14 Money, and general wealth by extension, was indeed a 
sore point. Affirmative action, which is what NEP is all about, was seen as a mechanism to 
counter such problems. It however, came under fire with growing discontent among certain 
groups who felt that the fruits of development were being enjoyed by selected groups only. 
The redistribution of wealth was deemed as a “Robin Hood-like manoeuvre” which would 
hamper the nation’s growth. Unfazed by critics, the NEP continued and managed to bring 
Malaysia out of the hostile era of the late 1960s into the more peaceful period of the 1980s.15
Flash forward, and now, many years later, the issue of achieving racial harmony is still 
top priority.16 This is where "1 Malaysia" fits into the current discourse on national 
governance. According to the Prime Minister’s personal website, "1 Malaysia" is described as 
intending to “…provide a free and open forum to discuss the things that matter deeply to us as 
a Nation. It provides a chance to express and explore the many perspectives of our fellow 
citizens. What makes Malaysia unique is the diversity of our peoples. "1 Malaysia"’s goal is 
to preserve and enhance this unity in diversity which has always been our strength and 
remains our best hope for the future. I hope this Website will initiate an open and vital 
dialogue exploring our Malaysian identity, purpose, and direction. I encourage each of you to 
join me in defining our Malaysia and the role we must play in its future. Each of us — despite 
our differences — shares a desire for a better tomorrow. Each of us wants opportunity, 
respect, friendship, and understanding.” 
                                                          
11
 Hasnul, op. cit. 
12
 Barr, M.D. (2002): Cultural Politics and Asian Values: The Tepid War, London, Routledge. 
13 Berita Nasional (BERNAMA) (2007): "Abdullah chides Opposition for spinning out issues", 27 August 2007, 
at http://www.bernama.com/bernama/v3/news.php?id=281491. 
14
 Bin Mohamad, Mahathir: "Malaysian: The Way Forward (Vision2020)", at http://www.epu.jpm.my/ 
02/28/1991; Victor, Wee: VISION 2020 AND ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS, PRIME LEADERSHIP 
AND MANAGEMENT COURSE (JUSA) SERIES 28 NO. 2/2003 INTAN, BUKIT KIARA ON 11 JULY 2003  
15 Berita Nasional (BERNAMA): "Be Truthful to the People, PM tells Leaders", 7 May 2009, at 
http://www.bernama.com.my/bernama/v5/newsindex.php?id=409363. 
16 Berita Nasional (BERNAMA): "Public feedback will determine ministers’ KPI", 30 April 2009, at 
http://www.bernama.com/bernama//v3/news_lite.php?id=408105. 
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3. Malaysia: The Vision
As the above quote from the Prime Minister’s website makes clear, it is the intention of the 
Malaysian government that the people of Malaysia be given ownership of the "1 Malaysia" 
project. The vision is expressed by the leadership, but the implementation is left to the people 
and hence allows a degree of flexibility and inclusiveness for fresh and innovative thinking 
and initiatives.17
The "1Malaysia concept" is grounded in and guided by the Malaysian Constitution.  The 
proponent of the concept, Prime Minister Razak has made this clarification very clear.18 "1 
Malaysia" acknowledges that there are certain underlying socio-political ideas in the 
Constitution which will shape the journey towards a nation that is truly united in diversity.   
"1 Malaysia"’s lineage is not confined to the Malaysian Constitution. It is also guided by what 
are commonly referred to as Malaysia’s “Documents of Destiny”19 together with the 
Malaysian Constitution, namely, the Rukunegara with its commitment to national unity, 
among other goals, and the NEP that had pledged to eradicate poverty irrespective of ethnicity 
and restructure society in order to reduce the identification of ethnicity with economic 
function. The third document is Wawasan 2020 or Vision 2020 which aims to bring Malaysia 
to a ‘middle-income’ status country by the year 2020.20
Accordingly, "1 Malaysia" is the latest in a series of ideas and visions which seek to 
promote unity among diverse communities in Malaysia. It is significant that such ideas and 
visions have emerged at regular intervals in the history of the nation – the Rukunegara and the 
New Economic Policy (NEP) 13 years after the 1957 Constitution; Wawasan 2020, 21 years 
after the Rukunegara and then the NEP; and now "1 Malaysia", 18 years after Wawasan 
2020.21 They represent renewal and rededication to an ideal which continues to elude the 
nation.22 It has been considered that one of the reasons why Malaysia is nowhere near its goal 
of a united nation is because of the absence of real efforts to inculcate in its people a profound 
understanding and appreciation of the three “Documents of Destiny.”23 It is believed that this 
is one of the reasons that even 51 years after independence, or Merdeka, a huge segment of 
the non-Malay population refuses to acknowledge the Malay root of the nation’s identity. 
Conversely, a sizeable section of the Malay population is reluctant to recognize the legitimacy 
of the non-Malay yearning for equality inherent in their status as long domiciled citizens of 
the land. Of course, developing a deeper understanding of the nation’s “Documents of 
Destiny” is not a solution. Additionally, there needs to be constant efforts to bridge the gulf 
between Constitutional principles and the goals of the Rukunegara, on the one hand, and the 
realities that confront the lives of the people, on the other, especially in relation to national 
                                                          
17
 Chong, T. (2006): "The Emerging Politics of Islam Hadhari", in Saw, Swee-Hock and K. Kesavapany (eds.): 
Malaysia: Recent Trends and Challenges, Singapore, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies. 
18
 Rosli, Firdaos and Ning, Hwa En: Working Group Meeting on “Sharing the Experiences of Inclusive Growth 
– Malaysia’s perspective”, Co-Chaired by NEAT Singapore and NEAT Indonesia, Network of East Asian Think-
Tanks (NEAT), Thursday, 28 June 2012. 
19
 Bin Mohamad, Mahathir, Malaysian : "The Way Forward (Vision2020)", at http://www.epu.jpm.my/ 
02/28/1991; Victor, Wee: VISION 2020 AND ENHANCING COMPETITIVENESS, PRIME LEADERSHIP 
AND MANAGEMENT COURSE (JUSA) SERIES 28 NO. 2/2003 INTAN, BUKIT KIARA ON 11 JULY 
2003. 
20
 Dupont, A.: "Is there an ‘Asian Way’?", Survival, vol. 38, no. 2 (1996), pp. 14-26. 
21
 Rosli and Ning, op.cit.
22
 Mahathir, Malaysian , "The Way Forward (Vision2020)", op. cit.; Wee, op. cit.
23
 Ghazali, K.: "The first keynote address of Abdullah Ahmad Badawi at the UMNO general assembly", 
Multilingua – Journal of Cross-Cultural and Interlanguage Communication, vol. 25, no. 1 (2006), pp. 129–142. 
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unity. More importantly, there is a growing need for Government and other actors to address 
the causes behind the failure to live up to such national goals.24
The "1 Malaysia" concept requires behavioural changes in society from Tolerance to 
Acceptance and finally to Celebration of the diverse ethnicities of the country.  The Principles 
expounded in the "1 Malaysia concept" are as follows – Unity in Diversity: Accepting 
diversity, embracing unique qualities and celebrating diversity as a competitive asset for the 
nation; Fairness for All: No single group should be marginalized on account of any element of 
their background be it ethnic, religious, political or socio-economic.25 Government is to 
provide support solely on the basis of individual need and merit in an attempt to balance the 
imperatives of meritocracy with social justice; Constitutional: Article 8 (1) which provides for 
equality of all Malaysians; Article 12 (1) which prohibits discrimination based on religion, 
race, descent or birthplace; Article 152 which safeguards reservations for the Bhumiputra in 
four specific areas – land, recruitment into public service; issuing permits or licenses for 
certain businesses; and scholarships and other forms of educational aid. 
Both the Rukunegara and Vision 2020 have common aspirations for "1 Malaysia":26
Rukunegara – Greater unity; democratic way of life; Just society; Liberal approach to rich and 
diverse cultural traditions; progressive society. Vision 2020 – 1 Bangsa Malaysia; a liberated, 
secured and developed Malaysia; democratic society; ethical society; liberal and tolerant 
society; progressive society; a fully caring society; an economically just society; a prosperous 
society. The objective of the vision is that the values of "1 Malaysia" find manifestation in the 
everyday lives of the Malaysian people, namely in their study, work and play.27
The key to this concept is the catchphrase ‘unity in diversity’. It is not a government-
sponsored programme in which to dilute the multi-cultural and multi-ethnic variations and 
create a singular hegemonic society, but rather to appreciate the plurality that is Malaysia and 
work together as one nation that can come to terms with and progress with diversity as its 
hallmark and strength.28
The "1 Malaysia concept" embodies the following key values in all its initiatives, 
activities, aims, objectives and goals: Tolerance; Integrity; a spirit of Moderation; widening 
Access to quality and affordable education; culture of excellence; raising the living standard 
of low income earners; waging a war against corruption; upgrading infrastructure in the rural 
and interior regions; improving public transportation in a modern period time; strengthening a 
system of meritocracy; reducing crimes; espousing qualities of perseverance and humility in 
all endeavors.29
                                                          
24
 Inoguchi, T and Newman, E. (1997): "Introduction: ‘Asian Values’ and Democracy in Asia", in ‘Asian Values’ 
and Democracy in Asia. 27 Mac. Shizouka: Shizuoka Prefectural Government, at http: 
//www.unu.edu/hq/unupress/asian-values.html. 
25
 Kessler, C.S., op. cit. 
26
 Mahathir, Malaysian , "The Way Forward (Vision2020)", op. cit. and Wee, op. cit.
27
 Rosli, Firdaos and Ning, Hwa En, Working Group Meeting on “Sharing the Experiences of Inclusive Growth 
– Malaysia’s perspective” Co-Chaired by NEAT Singapore and NEAT Indonesia, Network of East Asian Think-
Tanks (NEAT), Thursday, 28 June 2012. 
28
 Muzaffar, Chandra: "1 MALAYSIA: THE WAY AHEAD", 1Malaysia Foundation (16 June 2009). 
29
 Khoo B.T. (1995): Paradoxes of Mahathirism: an intellectual biography of Mahathir Mohamad, Kuala 
Lumpur, Oxford University Press. 
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The values of "1 Malaysia" are most certainly idealistic.30 An understanding of those 
values would depict an emphasis on hard work and virtues. But one value, i.e. integrity is 
considered to stand tall above the rest, in which without it, the rest will be mere rhetoric. The 
core of any project or task undertaken is the integrity of the parties involved.31 Should the 
moral compass of one side be skewed to fit whatever interests there may be, success would 
remain elusive. Integrity as described by the Prime Minister of Malaysia is all about 
government relations with the people. The government is expected to perform honourably and 
be honest to the people. In turn, the people are also to reciprocate by reposing trust and 
confidence in the government and acting in a manner that demonstrates trust in the fact that 
the government will act in the best interest of all the peoples of the country.  
Human rights and equality before the law, another great concern of the people must also 
be respected. The people need assurance that no one is beyond reproach or above the law. 
They must be granted with the laws that respects and protects their rights. Only then they may 
accord the government similar courtesy and respect.32
It should be added that integrity in the concept of "1 Malaysia" is not intended to be just 
between the government in power with the people who puts them in power, but also between 
the government sector and that of the private enterprises. This is, as a matter of fact, the 
cornerstone of ‘Malaysia Incorporated’ as was proposed and executed by the former Prime 
Minister, Tun Dr. Mahathir Mohammad in 1983. 
The present Prime Minister himself, in order to realize and measure progress on the "1 
Malaysia concept", has introduced mechanisms such as NKRAs and KPIs.33 The NKRA is the 
government’s target in six major issues. For each one area, KPI has been set to gauge the 
progress of the proposed changes. Six lead ministers have been appointed to head each of the 
NKRAs. Furthermore, KPIs have also been set for all the other ministries to include the 
ministers as well. Their performances and progress will be checked every six months by the 
Prime Minister himself.34
The NKRAs will serve as a benchmark or a yardstick by which the government could 
continually assess itself and make improvements if and when necessary. Together with the 
KPIs, it is hoped that all bureaucratic procedures will be streamlined and all resources will be 
fully utilized in the public sector to achieve the targeted results within an acceptable time 
frame.35
The 6 NKRAs are i. Reducing crimes. ii. War against corruption. iii. Widening the 
access to affordable and quality of education. iv. Raising living standard of the low income 
earners. v. Upgrading infrastructure in the rural areas and the interior region. vi. Improving 
public transportation in a moderate period of time.  
                                                          
30
 Mohd Azizuddin , Mohd Sani; Yusof, Norhafezah and Kasim, Azahar: "Malaysia in Transition: A 
Comparative Analysis of Asian Values, Islam Hadhari and 1Malaysia", Journal of Politics and Law, vol.2, no.3 
(September 2009). 
31 Ibid.
32
 Muzaffar, op. cit. 
33
 Lee B.C. (2008): Bagaimana Keris diganti dengan Merpati?, Kuala Lumpur, Oriengroup Sdn. Bhd. 
34
 Muzaffar, op. cit.
35
 Mohd Azizuddin , Yusof, and Kasim, op. cit.
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4.  "1 Malaysia": The Achievements and Challenges
It is believed that the "1 Malaysia concept" has helped foster a sense of ‘togetherness’ 
amongst a lot of young Malaysians. "1 Malaysia" has been associated with government upon 
extending assistance to the poor and needy, regardless of ethnicity. That social justice is more 
important than ethnic or religious affiliation is a key message of the "1 Malaysia" vision. For 
the first time the government of Malaysia is seen to be rewarding ability and excellence 
irrespective of ethnicity. The School Certificate Examination in 2010 which awarded 
scholarships to 9A plus scorers was testimony to this.36 Through "1 Malaysia", efforts are 
being made to increase the intake of non-Malays into the Civil Service, Police and Armed 
Forces and to ensure greater mobility in the public institutions.37
Regarding the challenges, the first to be mentioned is the ethnically and linguistically 
polarized primary school system. The separate language streams at primary school level 
remain a key challenge for "1 Malaysia". Ninety per cent of Chinese children and fifty per 
cent of Indian children, at the most critical phase of their lives in terms of the formation of 
fundamental values and attitudes, do not have the opportunity to interact with Malays in the 
same age category.38
Second, certain state policies in the sectors of education, civil and public services, and 
the economy are not conducive to fostering the vision of "1 Malaysia". 
Third, the Special Position of Malays and Bhumiputras in the Constitution and in 
particular the way they have been implemented is continuing to be an obstacle to achieving 
national unity. 
Fourth, perceptions: Chinese perceive the Chinese school system as a protection of their 
identity. The Malays perceive the Special Position in the Constitution for themselves and the 
Bhumiputras as protection of their rights in a competitive capitalist economy where the real 
power lies with the Chinese elite.39
Fifth, there exist from time immemorial, persons with vested interests with a stake in 
perpetuating ethnic dichotomies: Among Malays and Bhumiputras, there are groups who 
abuse the Special Provision embodied in the Malaysian Constitution to advance their own 
interests. 40 Conversely, the Chinese community continues to actively propagate Chinese 
primary and secondary education within the Chinese community. A related challenge is that 
some groups within the political opposition view "1 Malaysia" as a propaganda tool of the 
ruling party, Barisan National. 41
It is believed that this negative attitude has had its impact on sections of the Malaysian 
population preventing the concept from taking root in the hearts and minds of the citizenry. 42
                                                          
36
 Muzaffar, op. cit.
37
 Saad, Suhana: "Re-building the Concept of Nation Building in Malaysia", Asian Social Science, vol. 8, no. 4 
(April 2012).  
38
 Liew C. T.: Najib's Plots. The Malaysian Insider, 13 July 2009, at 
http://themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/opinion/liew-chin-tong/32146-najibs-plots. 
39
 Lopez, L. (2006): "Race rhetoric is part of Umno politics", The Straits Times. 17 November 2009, at 
http://malaysia-today.net/blog2006/newsncom.php?itemid=792. 
40
 Muzaffar, op.cit.
41
 Mahathir M. and Ishihara, S. (1995): The Voice of Asia: Two Leaders Discuss the Coming Century, Tokyo, 
Kodansha International. 
42
 Muzaffar, op. cit.
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What needs to be emphasized is that "1 Malaysia" is anchored in the Malaysian Constitution 
and linked to the Rukunegara and Wawasan 2020 which are instruments of nation-building 
and not political party manifestos.  
Sixth, a challenge is the unhelpful religious sentiments which undermine the practices 
and institutions of other religions ignoring the spirit of tolerance taught in all religions.43
A seventh challenge are communal pronouncements and ethnic distortions and 
misconceptions which are vented more than before in the public sphere. These mainly include 
those of the non-Malay intelligentsia to question the Malay position.44
Eighth, it is irrefutably true that the expansion and enhancement of the Special Position 
in the Constitution through the NEP in 1970 was a major factor in the economic and social 
transformation of the Malays. It is this massive transformation that has brought stability and 
relative peace and inter-ethnic harmony to the country. However, the implementation of 
Special Position and the NEP has its downside. The wealth gap within the Malay community 
has widened considerably partly because some individuals have exploited and manipulated 
the NEP to further their own interests. The NEP has also had a negative impact upon sections 
of the non-Malay communities as it has curbed and constrained educational opportunities and 
social mobility for some of them.45
5.  "1 Malaysia": The Way Forward
In order to address these shortcomings, the government should give greater emphasis to social 
justice in the policies and programmes emanating from the Special Position. Only those who 
deserve assistance, from the perspective of justice, should be helped. Likewise, justice 
demands that the non-Malay is given a helping hand or that accomplishment is recognized 
and rewarded’ when a need arises. The State should not hesitate to respond, in accordance 
with the constitutional provision on “the legitimate interests of the other communities.”46
But justice itself should not be viewed through a communal lens. This is the bane of 
many a multi-ethnic society, Malaysia included.47 If national unity is to be achieved, if "1 
Malaysia" is to become a reality, justice should be approached from a more holistic and 
balanced perspective. 
It is also believed that a needs-based approach – rather than the present emphasis on 
ethnicity in areas related to socio-economic justice could help to narrow the ethnic gap, which 
will in turn help to further the "1 Malaysia" vision.48
Avenues for interaction of students in the different language streams must be explored, 
including the setting up of sports teams or extra-curricular activities and clubs that draw on 
students from the different streams; monthly school assemblies, shared sports day and annual 
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concerts; A related strategy must endeavor to make the Bahasa Malaysia based primary 
school system attractive to all communities, the parents are the critical group to target in these 
efforts.  
Yayasan "1 Malaysia" in fact submitted a 10 point proposal to the government in 
February 2010 aimed at improving the quality and image of national schools. Among the 
recommendations were the rebranding of the national school so that it is perceived as “multi-
religious and inclusive”; the recruitment and employment of quality teachers; teacher training 
programmes that strengthen awareness of what national unity entails; improving the standard 
of English; effective teaching of Chinese, Tamil and other vernacular languages; emphasizing 
shared moral values; reducing bureaucratization in the administration of schools; and ensuring 
that education departments and the Ministry of Education become more representative of the 
multi-ethnic population mix. 49
What regards the Special Position of Malays, it is imperative for Malaysians to 
understand its roots, its evolution and the real reasons for its institutionalization. Not many 
people know that the constituent elements of the Special Position of the Malays: land 
reservations; public services positions; educational scholarships; and trade licenses were 
spawned during British rule as a way of protecting the people of the land who were being 
marginalized by the colonial economy. They were integrated into the Constitution of 
independent Malaya in 1957 mainly because the conferment of citizenship upon a huge 
segment of the non-Malay populace on incredibly liberal terms made the majority community 
abysmally vulnerable. Accordingly, raising public awareness in a systematic and organized 
manner to rectify inter-ethnic misunderstandings is critical to further 1Malaysia project. 
6. The Issues
6.1. The Constitution 
Misunderstandings and misconceptions about the Malaysian Constitution have had their 
impact on ethnic relations in the country. 50 The issues have been the following: “Equality” as 
stated in Article 8 (1) prohibits discrimination except when expressly authorized in the 
Constitution such as the “special provision”51 of Malays and natives of Sabah and Sarawak 
which was incorporated into the Constitution to protect the well-being of the abysmally poor 
indigenous Malays in the wake of conferment of citizenship upon more than a million 
recently domiciled Chinese and Indians on the eve of Independence.52 The special provisions 
which were brought in, address gross ethnic inequalities.53 It has been argued that if the 
original intention of the Special Provision is properly understood, it would not be seen as an 
affront to the principle of equality.54 The expansion of the scope for citizenship which 
continued for at least 13 years after Independence brought into stark relief the gross 
inequalities between the communities.55 Special Provision was therefore a form of affirmative 
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action that sought to redress socio-economic inequalities through the equalization of 
opportunities for hitherto marginalized groups.56
Article 153 of the Constitution is seldom highlighted as critical to inter-ethnic relations. 
The provision whilst calling to ensure special position of Malays and natives of Sabah and 
Sarawak, calls for the safeguarding of the legitimate interests of other communities.57
However this is a provision that might be criticized as not being practical. Even in 
theory it is not easy to balance competing interests on the same resources, and hence what 
becomes necessary is a framework or set of guidelines for assistance in implementing the 
provision.58 Such will ensure that priorities are made clear and factors that guide the balancing 
of interests of the communities are laid out to avoid potential conflicts from arising during 
implementation of the provision. 59
Much political rhetoric and media commentary has argued for the continuation of 
Chinese schools in the national education system but there is no such provision in either 
Article 12 which deals with rights in respect of education or in Article 152 which deals with 
national language.60 It is reiterated that Chinese, Tamil, or any other language can be legally 
taught within the national school system and that Chinese and Tamil primary schools are part 
of the national education system and their status is protected in law and policy. Article 152 (1) 
reads “no person shall be prohibited or prevented from using (other than for official purposes) 
or from teaching or learning any other language.”61 Such a provision makes it clear that while 
other languages are protected under the law, it does not include mandatory usage in official 
contexts. This can be problematic as it immediately relegates the status of languages of non-
Malay ethnic groups.62 It has been argued that both ignorance and intensification of 
communal politics continues to impinge upon the fundamental character of the nation and the 
structure of the Constitution.63
6.2. History and Identity 
The Malay pre-eminence and dominance in all spheres of public life has been attributed to the 
historic contribution of Malay peasantry to the progress of the country since pre-
Independence. 64 Historic Malay political entities, distinguished by Malay Sultans since 1136, 
have been characterized by the Malay language and Islam as fundamental elements which 
determined Malaysia’s identity.65
It has been asserted that accepting historical realities in no way relegates a citizen to 
‘second class’. Conversely, there are non-Malays who espouse a view of history which 
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ignores or downplays the role of other communities in shaping current Malaysia.66 It is argued 
that the way how Chinese and Indians have become part of the Malay society is a theme that 
needs to be emphasized in the current Malay-centric text books. 67
Ethnic biases on all sides together with other biases such as class and ideology and 
personal interests have all influenced the writing of Malaysian history. What is suggested is 
that there be a reappraisal and reduction of the element of subjectivity in the recording and 
writing of history. 68
There have been calls for the establishment of a truly multi-ethnic panel of historians 
and other academics which would be tasked with conducting a thorough review of history 
syllabi, history books, and teaching methodologies employed in schools.69 Local universities 
and Malaysian Historical Society should be consulted for the composition of such a panel. It 
is contended that while the country’s history is the immediate concern, the panel should also 
emphasize the importance of World History.70 In an increasingly globalized and borderless 
world, such becomes paramount.  It has even been proposed that based upon its evaluation of 
the teaching and learning of History in school, the proposed panel can then recommend 
whether it is necessary to make a pass in History a requirement for the secondary school 
examination.71
6.3. A Quest for Identity
Usually identities express themselves in different ways and at different levels and do not 
conflict with one another.72 But there are extraordinary circumstances that may lead to a clash 
of identities. In such situations the articulation of ethnic identity can sometimes be inimical to 
the quest for a national identity.73 The Malaysian case is no exception.74
A monumental challenge in the country has been the evolution of a shared Malaysian 
identity that all communities can be comfortable with. The quest for identity is linked very 
close to the acceptance of a common undisputed historical narrative.75 In the case of 
Malaysia, there is an intimate nexus between Malay identity and Malaysian identity.76 Article 
160(2) of the Malay Constitution defines Malay as those who profess Islam, habitually speak 
Malay and conform to Malay customs.77 Two of these characteristics actually define the 
identity of the Malaysian nation. Hence, the intimate nexus between Malay and Malaysian is 
obvious.78
It is argued that if all citizens are loyal to the Constitution, there will not be room for a 
clash of identities. The critical factor here then becomes empathy for the “other” and 
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understanding the position of the other ethnic communities whilst safeguarding and defending 
one’s own. This then becomes a prerequisite for the growth and development of a shared 
Malaysian identity.79
6.4. Religion
For a decade and a half since Independence, religion was not a hindrance to national unity.80
Islam was recognized as the religion of the country and continued to be featured both in 
ceremony and substance in the expression of Malaysia’s identity.81 From the eighties onwards 
strains began to appear with rapid Malay urbanization which began in the seventies and 
created a situation in which Muslims today share physical and cultural space with people of 
other faiths as never before.82 Together with this has been a rise of negative ethnic sentiments 
and because ethnicity is intimately intertwined with religion, ethnic antagonisms are often 
expressed as religious animosities and vice-versa.83
To overcome this challenge, the religious establishment, religious teachers at all levels 
and the media will have to develop a more enlightened outlook and meaning on the practice 
of faith in a multi-religious society.84 The growing presence of Evangelical Christians 
resulting in “unethical conversations” has also been a recent phenomenon in Malaysia as it 
has the world over.85 A number of Christian groups in Malaysia and other countries are 
opposed to such movements.86 These Christians emphasize the universal values of their 
religion which they know are shared by Islam and other faiths.87 It is these shared values that 
need to be highlighted as the country seeks to further a "1 Malaysia" vision and should be the 
foundation of unity in a multi-religious society.88
6.5. Education  
A segregated system of schooling was inherited from the British colonial government in 
Malaysia. Efforts have been many to integrate the various school systems into one National 
System that would be acceptable to all while preserving the languages and cultures of all 
communities. The Barnes Report (1951), the Educational Ordinance (1952) and Ho SengOng 
(1952), all recommended the need for one single-type school system to cater to the needs of 
all ethnic groups. Hence, the Barnes and Ho SengOng proposed the gradual termination of all 
vernacular schools and proposed that ultimately no government funds would be expended on 
communal institutions.89
The Razak Report which is the educational charter of the nation has spelt out the main 
thrusts of achieving unity through education. These include a common content syllabus, 
common examination system and implementation of Bahasa Melayu as the main medium of 
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instruction in all schools.90  However, the Razak Report as a political compromise seeks to 
maintain in the short term, the multilingual streams in the education system.91
Despite the many achievements of the national education system, it has failed to unite 
the different communities, while polarization and prejudices are on the rise: Chinese schools 
are increasing their enrolment, so too are the Tamil schools, whereas the National schools are 
dominated by Malay children with a small percentage of Chinese and Indians. Thus, in effect, 
what exists at the primary level – the level that is most important in moulding values and 
attitudes of children in their formative years - are three mono-ethnic streams. 
The reason has been that despite the several noble policies and missions, political 
compromises and bartering has over the years flawed the implementation process. 
Noteworthy is the extreme political pressure to which the government eventually succumbed 
regarding the controversial clause included in the 1996 Education Act which contained the 
faculties of the minister to convert vernacular schools and changes to the faculties of the 
Chinese Management Committees in the Education Act of 1961.  
Malaysia remains unusual, even compared with its neighbor Singapore, in allowing 
multilingual government – funded school streams - to operate side by side with the national 
stream. This remains a critical stumbling block to the realization of ideals enshrined in the 
ethos of "1 Malaysia". 
What remains is therefore the need for strong political will from the government of the 
day to reverse the process and make education a unifying factor towards achieving national 
integration.92 It has been suggested that interim measures to improve the situation until the 
long-term goal is achieved must be put in place. This mainly includes undertaking initiatives 
that improve the quality and image of national schools which are currently perceived as 
‘Malay schools’ and with a poor standard of English education.93
Accordingly, a series of measures have been proposed and include rebranding, together 
with provision of best facilities and infrastructure, instituting quality teachers from all 
communities who are trained in inter-ethnic issues and sensitivities, quality English language 
teaching, greater number of extra-curricular activities and opportunities for exposure and 
personality development and more importantly, increasing the attention to the teaching of 
vernacular languages. While measures above and other measures will help to foster a multi-
ethnic image where every citizen feels a stakeholder in the national system of education, it is 
imperative that the teaching profession, Ministry of Education, government departments 
become more representative of ethnic distribution of the country and state variation.  
It is strongly believed that the interim measures proposed above must be associated with 
and closely accompanied by a parallel strategy that will actively work towards evolving a 
single system of education for the country.94
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6.6. The Economy  
The Malaysian economy has been “ethnicized”95 since Independence when the economic 
vulnerability of the majority Malay population had led to the Special Provision being 
incorporated into the Federal Constitution of the country.96
The subsequent New Economic Policy led to the rapid social and economic 
transformation of one community in a single generation. For all its achievements, the ethnic 
approach to the economy had also negative consequences.97 First, it has constricted 
educational and economic opportunities for important sections of the non-Malay communities 
and has constrained their social mobility.98 Two, politically well-connected elements 
especially in middle and upper strata of the Malay community have benefitted much more 
from contracts, licenses, shares and dictatorships disbursed in the name of helping the 
community than ordinary Malays who continue to struggle to make a living. Three, the ethnic 
approach has increased ethnic polarization at various levels of society. 99
It is believed that in the quest for "1 Malaysia", there is a burning need to reverse the 
adverse impact of the ethnic approach:100 For this, the equilibrium established in the 
Constitution between ‘Special Position’ and ‘the legitimate interests of other communities’ 
should be faithfully observed in policy and implementation;101 the concept behind the first 
prong of the National Economic Policy, ‘the eradication of poverty irrespective of ethnicity’ 
should be expanded to embrace the needy and the disadvantaged,102 whatever their cultural 
and religious background.103 That is, “need” and not “ethnicity” should be the guiding 
principle in providing assistance in areas such as education and housing. Hence, the challenge 
that remains is to make “de-ethnicizing” the economy and enhancing justice for all, the 
agenda of each and every Malaysian.104
The challenge of low incomes and widening inequalities in Malaysian society is yet 
another issue that has been flagged. To ensure inclusiveness, it is imperative that not only “a 
living income” for the bottom 40% is ensured105 but also that there is a reduction in the 
increasing economic and social disparities that are an affront to human dignity.106
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II. SRI LANKA
7. The Background
The root causes of the three-decade conflict in Sri Lanka can be traced back to 
unequal treatment of the Tamil population and both real and perceived discrimination by the 
State.107  Many Tamils believed the State and its structures favoured the interests of the 
majority community, and several changes in State practices were seen as discriminatory and 
unjust.  The Tamil community’s campaign was against State structures and policies 
considered discriminatory of the Tamils rather than against the Sinhalese. The failure of the 
dominant sections of the Sinhala polity to address these grievances, the failure to rigorously 
examine changes in policy and practice by successive governments, so as to take into 
account possible adverse impacts on minorities and avoid such impacts, the subsequent 
creation of a Tamil political leadership which permitted the growth of unrealistic expectations 
amongst the Tamil youth, all contributed to the birth of Tamil militancy. Finally, the 
democratic Tamil political leadership lost control and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam 
(LTTE) monopolized the Tamil struggle, with disastrous consequences for Tamils as well as 
for the country as a whole. 
In its assessment of relations between the different ethnic groups in Sri Lanka, the 
Soulbury Commission referred to a permanent Sinhalese majority of more than two thirds of 
the total population, with the next largest segment (Tamils exclusive of up-country 
Tamils) being around ten percent. The Commission argued that the character of majority-
minority relations was shaped by these demographic realities and governed by deep-
seated predispositions entrenched in the consciousness of both majority and minority which 
led to apprehension and distrust.108
Though some Tamil grievances were expressed early on, it was only after 1956, 
following the Official Languages Act, that the political agenda of the Tamil parties 
underwent a fundamental change. For the first time after independence, the statement of 
Tamil grievances is clearly presented in the Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact and 
explicitly linked to the need for political power at the regional level. 
The Bandaranaike–Chelvanayakam Pact was unilaterally abrogated by Prime 
Minister Bandaranaike. Thereafter, broken pledges on the part of successive governments 
became a recurrent feature of the Sinhala–Tamil relationship and an overriding Tamil 
grievance. But the decisive rift in the inter-ethnic relationship came with the anti-Tamil riots 
of 1977 and 1981, the latter accompanied by a government motion of no-confidence in the 
leader of the democratic Tamil opposition. When this was followed by the Black July attacks 
of 1983, and the failure of the Government to provide adequate protection to Tamil citizens, 
while effectively driving the main Tamil political party out of parliament, militancy took over 
as the preferred option for many Tamil youngsters.109
With the emergence of armed groups in support of Tamil demands, the conflict took 
a different complexion with attacks and counterattacks resulting in the deaths of 
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large numbers of civilians. This allowed the Government to refer only to a terrorist problem 
and ignore root causes, thus contributing to the continuing political problem receiving 
less attention. Attitudes began to harden amongst many on both sides of the communal 
divide, making it difficult for moderates to push for a just solution through negotiations.110
Successive governments attempted negotiations with representatives of the Tamil 
people, but these broke down for multiple reasons. The LTTE took advantage of such 
negotiations at times in its campaign to establish dominance and decimate all other Tamil 
groups and persons advancing a Tamil voice in national politics. These developments led to 
what is inevitable in armed conflict, the loss of civilian life on both sides.111
With the defeat of the LTTE in May 2009, the armed conflict came to an end. 
However, the root causes of the conflict remain and have to be addressed in order to prevent 
the recurrence of the past in whatever form. Further, the war caused additional 
negative fallouts such as physical destruction of infrastructure, an amplification of socio-
economic deprivation in the war-torn areas of the country, and loss of life of Tamil civilians 
caught up in the final phase of the war. It also led to increased suspicion and resentment 
amongst the three main ethnic communities in the country and widened the gap in trust 
and understanding.112
  
8. The Sinhala Community
The State must not lose sight of the need to allay the fears and anxieties of the Sinhalese who, 
though a majority, have their own share of concerns, both real and imagined. Many actions 
that discriminated against minorities sprang initially from a widespread perception amongst 
the Sinhalese that they had been discriminated against by the British.113 Assertion of the need 
for government to function in the language of the majority, positive discrimination to 
compensate for real and perceived educational inequalities, land redistribution to make up for 
the expropriation of peasant lands for plantations with the concomitant importation of labour 
from India, all sprang from the need to make up for deprivations imposed by the colonial 
government. In the process, however, they led to deprivation of the minorities because of 
failure to explore comprehensively the implications of any actions. Similarly, any solution 
meant to resolve the problems of Tamils and Muslims now must not be at the expense of the 
Sinhalese. That is not only unfair and unjust, but it would make such a solution unsustainable 
in the long run.114
With regard to specific grievances of Sinhalese in villages adjacent to former conflict 
areas, the LLRC Commission notes that the Government has tended to overlook those who 
lived in villages such as Weli Oya, Moneragala and Kebethigollawa, who survived the 
terror perpetrated by the LTTE. The people in these villages continued to live under 
tremendous threats to their lives without migrating to safe areas in the South. They faced 
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security risks, hardships in education, disrupted and fractured livelihoods, and paucity of 
healthcare and transport facilities. Moreover, the Sinhalese who resided in the Eastern 
Province faced inadequacies of the administrative system. For instance, Weli Oya is 
categorised under a number of districts, a section under the Mullaitivu district, a section under 
the Vavuniya district and another under the Trincomalee district. As a result, numerous 
difficulties were faced by people in the areas, where administration is carried out in Tamil, 
whereas people living in Weli Oya are predominantly Sinhalese.115
Communities across Sri Lanka have also suffered immensely as a result of the loss of 
family members who served in the armed forces. The severe psychological impact of the war 
on these communities often goes unacknowledged.116
9. The Tamil Community 
The perception of discrimination and unequal treatment within the Tamil population 
arose from a series of administrative changes, such as discrimination against the use of the 
Tamil language in a context where education was segregated by language.117 This contributed 
to deprivation in terms of jobs, which was exacerbated by the State being the 
predominant employer in the context of Statist economic policies. Discriminatory policies in 
education and in recruitment to the public services struck hardest at the well-educated Tamils 
in the North. The discrimination was seen as arising from the fact that central government and 
its decision making processes were far removed from the needs and aspirations of the 
Tamil people.118 The many youth rebellions all over the country testify to the sense of 
alienation felt generally by the rural population, but in the North and East this sense was 
increased by the absence of representation at decision-making levels in government. In 
addition, State control of lands and colonization schemes were disproportionately beneficial 
to the majority community and were perceived by the Tamil communities as intended to 
effect demographic changes.119
Although the death and destruction caused by the war and the atrocities of the LTTE 
affected all communities, the suffering of the Tamil population in the war zones of the North 
and the East, particularly the people in the Vanni, were of an intensity and magnitude that far 
exceeded that of the population in the rest of the country.120 The recognition of the special 
problems that have consequently arisen in the North and East must therefore guide and direct 
the National Policy on Reconciliation, at all times. The deprivations which this section of the 
population have undergone and the conditions that have been thereby created – the repeated 
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displacements, the destruction of homes, livelihood and infrastructure, the death and 
disappearance of loved ones –require affirmative processes for restoration and reparation, 
together with mechanisms for accountability and the protection of human rights that take full 
account of the special nature of their grievances.121
  
10. The Muslim Community
The Muslims, though not direct protagonists in the armed conflict between the LTTE and the 
Sri Lankan State, have undergone considerable suffering during the years of fighting in the 
North and East. The forcible eviction of the entire Muslim community from the 
Northern Province by the LTTE, the massacre of around two hundred Muslims while 
worshipping in mosques in Kattankudy and Eravur , the takeover of lands belonging to the 
Muslims in the Eastern Province, the deprivation of the livelihoods of Muslims in the conflict 
areas and the lack of adequate security to the Muslims were a few of the phenomena that 
contributed greatly to the sense of insecurity and unease that Muslims faced because of the 
conflict. 
Unlike the Tamil community which challenged State structures as a means of 
addressing grievances, the Muslims took a separate political path and preferred to engage with 
the State and work within the mainstream of Sri Lankan politics. This created a great deal 
of misunderstanding between the Tamil and Muslim communities and caused a strain in 
their relationship. There are also perceptions that lands are being taken over for occupation 
by the security forces without due consultation or process.122
11. Inter-Ethnic Conflict
Discrimination against the Tamil population which is seen to lie at the root of the three-
decade conflict has been attributed to the struggle between a majority community and 
a minority community, where the latter seeks space to operate within a larger polity. 
The notion of democracy dictates that a balance must be achieved for this in a manner that 
is not at the expense of any community.123
The balance to be found must be premised upon the common need for national 
integration and peaceful coexistence. In negotiating such a balance, trust is a prerequisite. 
There currently exists a trust deficit which has contributed to the view that, as the 
minority moves towards advocating geographical separation, any concession by the State will 
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be detrimental to the majority community. Conversely, the Tamil minority lacks confidence 
and trust as a result of failed aspirations and expectations.124
  
12. Challenges and Opportunities
As a result of the long-standing strife and struggle, two key challenges remain to be addressed 
so as to propel the country towards enduring and sustainable peace and prosperity. First, the 
root causes of the conflict need solutions that are satisfactory to all the communities and 
peoples of Sri Lanka. Second, there is a need to dispel suspicions and weld all communities 
into and within the fabric of one nation.   
Sri Lanka is faced with a unique opportunity to foster sustainable peace, unity and 
national reconciliation. The present Government wields the broad support of the majority of 
the country and possesses the capacity to present a political solution that is acceptable to 
all peoples and communities. The present popularity of the President, in particular must 
be treated as an asset, which can be used to convince the majority community of the 
urgent need for national reconciliation whereby all communities could live in peace, dignity 
and equality. 
A further opportunity has arisen in respect of the political representation of Tamil 
interests. With the demise of the LTTE, a moderate Tamil voice has been permitted to 
emerge and flourish. The present representatives of the Tamil people have expressed 
strong commitment to a political solution within a united Sri Lanka. This opportunity must 
be swiftly seized, as extremism within the Island and among the Diaspora can only be 
dealt with by empowering moderate and reasonable voices. 
Finally, the end of the armed conflict has opened up space to address the task of 
nation building unhindered by preoccupation with a debilitating armed struggle, which was a 
drain on the nation's resources.125 With the Sri Lankan Government’s efforts to ensure large 
infrastructure development in the past two years, healthy growth rates have been achieved. 
There remains a need to take further steps so that economic achievements may be translated 
into meaningful and equitable benefits that will impact on the life of every Sri Lankan. In this 
context, there remains a need for political reforms that entrench empowerment and a 
willingness to bring closure for the suffering of individuals and communities as a whole. 
  
13. The Context
The engagement of the Government and the Tamil National Alliance in talks aimed at a 
political settlement began with considerable interest following the end of the war in 2009, 
thereby awakening hope in the nation for a new era of peace. However, as it now stands, the 
talks have reached a stalemate. There is a need for the casting aside of political rivalries on 
both sides, to ensure that a framework of peace and understanding for both the majority 
Sinhalese community and the Tamil and Muslim minorities are arrived at and guaranteed 
through the early resumption of talks. 
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Two national processes are worthy of consideration in this context. First, the Lessons 
Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) report calls upon the Government, among 
others, to work towards a political solution acceptable to all communities. The home-grown 
mechanism, independent in nature though commissioned by the Government, was developed 
to reflect upon and recommend action, and drew on solicited and unsolicited submissions 
from the public in all areas of the country and hence has been hailed for its credibility and 
transparency.  
Second, and pursuant to its pledges at the United Nations' Universal Periodic Review, 
the Government embarked on drafting a National Human Rights Action Plan in 2009.126 The 
Action Plan has sought to address the objective of improving the human rights protection and 
promotion in all aspects, with targets to be achieved in five years. The Action Plan has 
subsequently been adopted by the Cabinet. The efforts that have been invested in formulating 
the Action Plan will sadly be lost if subsequent action is not taken in an expedient manner.  
Furthermore, there is the risk, as is being seen, of such measures being labeled as mere 
rhetoric, if not translated into concrete and concerted follow-up action.  
III. FROM "1 MALAYSIA" TO "1 SRI LANKA"
When assessing and evaluating the prospect of adopting a potential "1Sri Lanka" project 
along the lines of its Malaysian counterpart, it becomes critical that the inter-ethnic relations 
and tensions of the two countries be compared. Such will in turn be valuable in informing the 
framework of cooperation and initiating dialogue between Sri Lanka and Malaysia. There is 
hope that the recommendations emanating from the foregoing and subsequent discussion will 
inform Track 1 diplomatic efforts between the two countries while providing a platform for 
building upon diplomatic efforts at all other levels comprising the enterprise of Multi-track 
diplomacy. 
Both Sri Lanka and Malaysia were former British colonies which were transformed in 
plural societies. Sri Lanka: Sinhala and Tamil communities were linked to Kandyan and 
Jaffna kingdoms which predated colonial occupation. Muslims too were established as a 
community prior to British rule. It was only the plantation Tamils that were brought down by 
the British to work in the tea estates as plantation workers and labourers. The majority of 
Chinese and Indian communities in Malaysia were established during colonial rule.  
Consequently, British colonial policies relating to labour and economy created a gulf between 
Sinhalese and the Tamils in Sri Lanka, and between the Malays and Chinese and Indians in 
Malaysia. 
While both countries inherited seeds of inter-ethnic strife from the times of colonial 
rule, successive governments in both countries have compounded the issues. The Language 
Policy, namely the Sinhala Only Act, of the late S.W.R.D. Bandaranaike regime inflamed 
much anger in the Tamil speaking populations. Similarly, the language policy of sections of 
the United Malays National Organization (UMNO) resulted in anger among the Chinese and 
Indian communities.  
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Scholars in both countries have agreed that the differences between the two countries 
regarding the inter-ethnic conflict are more important than the similarities: six key differences 
have been noted.127
First, unlike in Malaysia, both main parties to the conflict, Sinhalese and Tamil see 
themselves as indigenous to the land by way of linkages to ancient kingdoms in Kandy and 
Jaffna respectively that lived for centuries prior to British colonization. Hence, a higher 
language status, special economic assistance and dominant political position of either will not 
be acceptable to the other. In Malaysia, the Malay community is regarded as indigenous 
bonded by ties of history and culture to the land by both the Malay and non-Malay 
communities. Hence, special constitutional provisions regarding language, affirmative action 
and national politics have not been seriously contested or opposed. 
Second, the economic model adopted in both countries is starkly different and has had 
an impact on ethnic relations. In Sri Lanka: a welfarist approach to subsidization of essential 
goods and services coupled with a dwindling capital base characterized by disinterest in 
foreign investment and capital. This in turn led to a rapidly shrinking resource base for 
redistribution amongst a growing Sinhalese working class. The parallel affluence of a small 
section of the Tamil community caused tensions between the communities.  In contrast, 
Malaysia has emphasized economic growth with equity since independence. A key difference 
has been the industrialization programmes of both countries; Malaysia adopted an export 
based industrialization programme whereas Sri Lanka’s import-focused industrialization 
programme failed to transform the economy. The continuing economic growth in Malaysia 
was cleverly used to address inequalities and redress imbalances existing within and between 
the communities at different points in its history.  
Third, a lack of consensus on “ethnic fundamentals” in Sri Lanka exacerbated by 
economic stagnation has not been able to meet the needs of Tamil and Sinhala communities. 
In Malaysia, consensus has been achieved: on the eve of independence Malays agreed to 
accord full citizenship to non-Malays in return for the latter being given special provision in 
the form of affirmative action and political pre-eminence. 
Fourth, Jaffna Tamils are associated with a certain geographical space making their 
struggle stronger. The Chinese and Indians are not associated with a specific geographic space 
in Malaysia.  
Fifth, Jaffna Tamils also have the advantage of ethnic propinquity. They are in the 
vicinity of the Tamil heartland – Tamil Nadu in the South of India which has a population of 
60 million. This has had a negative impact on inter-ethnic relations. In Malaysia, the Chinese 
and Indians do not have China and India as their immediate neighbours. Indonesia has 
maintained a policy of non-interference in Malaysian affairs for over 30 years. 
Sixth, over the last 16 years, a small Tamil population has resorted to an armed 
struggled to address their grievances. The LTTE became synonymous with violence and 
terror. Malaysia, by way of comparison, has been free of political violence since 
Independence save for one or two violent eruptions which were contained immediately.  
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14. Externalization of inter-Ethnic Conflict
A significant distinguishing factor worthy of separate consideration is that unlike the inter-
ethnic tensions prevailing in Malaysia, the inter-ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka has over the years 
been “externalized” and “internationalized.” Hence, any response to the inter-ethnic tensions 
will have to also be accorded an “international dimension” even if not being “externalized” to 
the same extent as the conflict itself.128
Further, it cannot be disputed that as a result of the “internationalization” of the inter-
ethnic conflict in Sri Lanka, international politics has had a significant bearing on ethnic 
relations; international politics has and continues to factor in national considerations and 
domestic political battles.129
It is beyond dispute that Sri Lanka’s three decade conflict was externalized due to a 
combination of factors, among others, ranging from the presence of an active expatriate 
community abroad; the involvement of foreign facilitators in the peace process; and the 
presence of foreign peacekeeping forces in 1987. By the end of the war, Sri Lanka was placed 
well within significant cynosure of the international radar. Such international attention has 
spilled over into the country’s post-war phase as well, but this time taking on new meaning. 
As it currently stands, Sri Lanka faces a number of challenges in its foreign relations. 
Six key challenges need to be addressed with priority. 
First, distinction needs to be drawn between, on the one hand, voluntary participation in 
international mechanisms and the subsequent rules of procedure, obligations of 
implementation, and reporting that come with it, and, on the other hand, an encroachment of a 
nation's sovereignty and territorial integrity that are not as a result of a nation's undertaking. 
The true test of our sovereignty will be to follow the nation’s interest, assume strong national 
positions and communicate such positions effectively to the local and international 
communities. We must understand that the opportunity to justify our policies is an exercise of 
sovereignty, and not an encroachment of it.  
Second, we live in an age of globalization and unprecedented connectivity that is 
characteristic of the twenty first century, permeating all aspects of governance including 
foreign and international relations. In an inter-dependent world the only way of maintaining 
sovereignty is not through hostility but through constructive engagement. Sovereignty is a 
relative concept. Accordingly, sovereignty in this era can only be maintained to the extent we 
learn to live in inter-dependence and not in hostility.  
Third, the impact that the members of the heterogeneous expatriate community have on 
the politics and electoral campaigns of host governments must be given serious consideration 
in our foreign policy discourse. The best way to deal with it is to address the rights of 
minorities locally, both systematically and genuinely. Rights of minorities need to be coupled 
with assurances for the possibility of peaceful return and life in the country. This is once 
again illustrative of how domestic policy and foreign policy are inextricably linked. 
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Fourth, the fostering and maintenance of credibility of national positions should be the 
underlying objective of the conduct of our foreign relations. This will require that there is one 
interlocutor between the state and international community. The internal consensus will not 
only prevent confusion and contradiction but also help maintain credibility and reveal the 
strength of the establishment – this will be the true test of exercising sovereignty in the 
conduct of our foreign affairs. 
Fifth, most of the country's bilateral and multilateral engagements are haunted by a 
specter of reconciliation and human rights concerns. We must remember that human rights 
and inter-communal harmony are not alien to our country, the values of which are enshrined 
in our shared history, cultures and legal frameworks. We need to capitalize and draw on these 
strengths to forge a robust system of governance that will be able to function with 
independence and credibility. Hence, for every allegation made, we will have the availability 
of structures and norms to deal with such allegations domestically. In this regard, the 
implementation of the outcomes of the two national processes, namely the Lessons Learnt and 
Reconciliation Commission and the National Human Rights Action Plan will demonstrate that 
homegrown mechanisms can credibly provide solutions, while improving our foreign 
relations and prospects. Here once again is a demonstration of the link between domestic and 
foreign policy. 
Lastly, due to the conflict, we were largely inward-looking, preoccupied with internal 
considerations and taking up defensive positions in human rights and other international 
forays. With the end of the war, there is now a need to broaden our areas of engagement into 
areas such as trade, science, environment, human and arms trafficking, terrorism, and regional 
cooperation. With a shift to the post-war phase, an identification of priorities and a policy of 
engagement must be pursued to find common ground. 
In the final analysis, it is the consolidation of peace, freedom, democracy and the 
domestic rule of law that will translate into the ability for us to project our nation as sovereign 
and credible in the international domain – the link between the protection of our national 
interests and international positioning cannot be clearer. 
15. Recommendations for a 1Sri Lanka Concept
Since the end of the armed struggle in May 2009, natural processes of reconciliation are 
taking place in Sri Lanka.130 While the path to moderation, tolerance and coexistence must be 
paved as prerequisites for genuine peace and reconciliation, so must an organized process of 
reconciliation be put in place to prevent a relapse or resurgence of past animosities that 
initially led to hostilities.131
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Accordingly, a four-pronged strategy can be proposed: The first, second and third have 
already been completed with the rehabilitation of 11,500 LTTE cadres,132 the reintegration of 
280,000 displaced and the process of reconstruction of the north and east, particularly the 
Wanni. 133
It is now time for the active initiation of programmes on reconciliation highlighting its 
role in realizing the fourth aspect -- the building of relationships between and within 
communities.134 This must, however, be state-led to have any meaningful value and 
outcome.135 While not discounting the need and value of all actors and stakeholders joining 
hands to contribute towards reconciliation, the need for the state-led process is critical given 
the nature of the conflict in the first place, namely - one where the Tamil community sought 
to restructure the State with a view to removing features discriminatory of the minorities as 
opposed to what has been usually described as a struggle between the Sinhala majority 
community and Tamil minority community per se. 
While the Government's efforts in the rehabilitation and resettlement processes in the 
North-East have been commendable, it is imperative that the important next step is taken - 
reaching out to the Tamil community to address their concerns and grievances.136
The Muslim community has oft been caught in the crossfire and hence needs to be taken 
seriously and made stakeholders in any endeavour aimed at peace and stability. Accordingly, 
the minority communities too must be urged to reposition themselves - by not only 
demanding equality but also conducting themselves as equals. One way of doing this is for the 
minority communities not to speak on issues affecting their respective communities only but 
also to participate in national issues and lead national campaigns.137
The key purpose of reconciliation is to address the underlying suspicion, mistrust and 
discrimination that have been manifest and symptomatic of the three-decade conflict. Creating 
a sense of inter-dependence between all communities is crucial if minority communities are to 
feel a connection to the newly-rebuilt nation. 
 In this connection, two positive developments in the current political context are 
worthy of note - increasing acceptance that the conflict requires a political settlement as 
opposed to the view that it is only a terrorist problem; and rather than operating through a top-
                                                          
132
 Yusuf, Salma: "Transitional justice: Rehabilitation in review", Daily Mirror, 31 July 2012, at 
http://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/172-opinion/20735-transitional-justice-rehabilitation-in-review.html. 
133
 Statement delivered by Ravinatha P. Aryasinha, Permanent Representative of Sri Lanka and leader of the Sri 
Lanka Delegation to the 23rd Session of the Human Rights Council on May 27, 2013, in response to the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights’ update on her Annual Report to the Human Rights Council, at
http://www.dailymirror.lk/opinion/172-opinion/30104-sl-has-made-significant-strides-in-reconciliation-process-
.html. 
134
 Yusuf, Salma: "The potential and promise, three years after the end of war", The Sunday Times, 13 May 2012, 
available at: http://www.sundaytimes.lk/120513/News/nws_29.html. 
135
 Yusuf, Salma: "Sri Lanka: A Nation Moves On: A Review of Sri Lanka’s First National Reconciliation 
Conference titled "Reconciliation: The Way Forward for Post-Conflict Sri Lanka", e-International Relations, 3 
January 2012, at http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/03/sri-lanka-a-nation-moves-on/. 
136
 Yusuf, Salma: "The potential and promise, three years after the end of war", The Sunday Times, 13 May 2012, 
at http://www.sundaytimes.lk/120513/News/nws_29.html. 
137
 Yusuf, Salma: "Sri Lanka: A Nation Moves On: A Review of Sri Lanka’s First National Reconciliation 
Conference titled "Reconciliation: The Way Forward for Post-Conflict Sri Lanka", e-International Relations, 3 
January 2012, at http://www.e-ir.info/2012/01/03/sri-lanka-a-nation-moves-on/. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
213 
down approach of political patronage and proxies there is now a recognition of the need to 
engage elected representatives of the Tamil community in the nation building endeavour.138
That said, it must be remembered that reconciliation is both a process and a goal. Hence, 
it will necessarily require time and space to bear fruit. Reconciliation cannot be imposed or 
forced on a nation as an event. It requires both a strategy and a systematized response 
mechanism by the state and other stakeholders to deal with the likely obstacles that will 
emerge along the way.139
Another aspect of nation-building that requires immediate attention in Sri Lanka is the 
promotion and protection of the rule of law. The Rule of Law should be considered as the 
bedrock for achieving a democratic and economically developed society. The political and 
administrative will has to be garnered, or else nation building efforts will be hindered.140
Four aspects which remain critical to Sri Lanka's nation-building enterprise are: First, 
the need for internal consensus within government of positions related to issues of national 
importance:141such will augur well not only for keeping citizens and stakeholders informed of 
national decisions and plans but also for the country's international relations; Second and 
closely related, is the need for an improvement in the state's visibility strategy which will not 
only serve as a barometer for measuring progress but also identify gaps to be filled by 
providing direction for taking the nation-building and peace-building agenda forward; 
Thirdly, there remains a need for greater and more active involvement of citizens and relevant 
groups in national processes of consultation particularly in decisions that have an impact on 
those particular groups and persons. Additionally, such involvement will reap the invaluable 
benefits of fostering increased buy-in for the processes and programmes, while improving 
implementation and ensuring sustainability of dividends.142 Fourthly, any state action ought to 
be as a result of deliberation and a conscious decision making process, as opposed to being 
perceived as knee-jerk and ad hoc sporadicism.143
Ultimately, it is a home-grown political process addressing the economic, social and 
political grievances and aspirations, acceptable to all sections of society that will address the 
critical aspects of nation building - a nation that yearns to metamorphose into one that finds 
its strength in multiculturalism and diversity 
Finally, most of the country's bilateral and multilateral engagements are haunted by a 
specter of reconciliation and human rights concerns. We must remember that human rights 
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and inter-communal harmony are not alien to the country, the values of which are enshrined 
in our shared history, cultures and legal frameworks. We need to capitalize and draw on these 
strengths to forge a robust system of governance that will be able to function with 
independence and credibility.144 Hence, for every allegation made, we will have the 
availability of structures and norms to deal with such allegations domestically. In this regard, 
the implementation of the outcomes of the two national processes, namely the Lessons Learnt 
and Reconciliation Commission and the National Human Rights Action Plan will demonstrate 
that homegrown mechanisms can credibly provide solutions, while improving our foreign 
relations and prospects. Here once again is a demonstration of the link between domestic and 
foreign policy.145
It is in such a context, that a potential "1 Sri Lanka" project based on a model similar to 
the "1 Malaysia" project must be considered. A caveat is in order. Given the differences in 
nature, form and extent of the inter-ethnic relations and related occurrences and consequences 
between the two countries, the Malaysian model cannot be seen to be relevant or applicable to 
Sri Lanka "in toto". What becomes important then is to formulate a project for Sri Lanka that 
embodies the overall ethos and notion of the "1 Malaysia" project, that is to foster inter-ethnic 
harmony and national unity, but one that is framed within the contours of local Sri Lankan 
realities.146
The next point to consider is whether there is a need for such a project in Sri Lanka. 
Since the conclusion of the armed struggle with the defeat of the Tamil tigers by the 
Government of Sri Lanka in May 2009, the latter have put in place a mechanism called the 
Lessons Learnt and Reconciliation Commission (LLRC) which was to be modeled on a Truth 
and Reconciliation Commission along the lines of that instituted in South Africa on the heels 
of the collapse of the Apartheid regime. However, despite the almost unanimous welcome that 
the LLRC Interim and Final Report received both nationally and internationally, the 
implementation of the recommendations is still to take place.  
Hence, the need for such a project becomes relevant now more than ever in Sri Lanka. 
Given the need for a nationally adopted policy on reconciliation, there currently exists a 
lacuna in post-war efforts in Sri Lanka: a vision for reconciliation and fostering of a sense of 
togetherness between the communities is starkly and conspicuous in its absence. A vision and 
policy that is state-led and has the consensus and buy-in from all factions in government is the 
need of the hour. 
Such will serve four key purposes: First, it will help the process of reconciliation, inter-
ethnic amity and national unity, by increasing faith in the State by the minority communities 
and also demonstrate to the international community that Sri Lanka as a nation is keen and 
serious about achieving inter-ethnic unity. The latter becomes critical given the fact that the 
Sri Lankan conflict and post-conflict era has been under international scrutiny as described in 
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an earlier part of this report. Third, such a project will provide vision and direction for post-
war efforts in the country to the government, civil society, religious leaders, the business 
community, the media, the educationists and other stakeholders. Fourth, it will demonstrate 
commitment to reconciliation, inter-ethnic harmony and national unity by the State and the 
government. 
Logically following from the conclusion reached in the foregoing discussion, that is, 
that there does in fact exist a need and relevance for a "1 Sri Lanka" project along the lines of 
its Malaysian counterpart, the next aspect to be considered is what such a project should 
entail. Though the details must be a result of further deliberation and multi-stakeholder 
participation and consensus, the following will be a springboard to catalyze and initiate 
dialogue towards such a discussion. 
A "1Sri Lanka" concept must espouse, not unlike its Malaysian counterpart, a culture of 
excellence, perseverance, acceptance, education, integrity, meritocracy, humility and loyalty. 
It must also encompass National Key Results Areas (NKRIs) and Key Performance Indicators 
(KPIs) on issues that are seen as critical to generate inter-dependence between the majority 
and minority communities in the country with the aim of fostering inter-ethnic amity but also 
for an actual and perceived sense of justice and fairness and equality to all its peoples, the 
lack of which was one of the key drivers of violence and tensions between communities in the 
past. 
As a prerequisite to instituting a "1 Sri Lanka" vision, the Government of Sri Lanka 
needs to engage major concerns that have haunted inter-ethnic relations in the country for 
over three decades. Without correcting them, all efforts towards a "1 Sri Lanka" notion will 
fail.  
The policy recommendations that follow will also demonstrate how a "1 Sri Lanka" 
project, unlike the "1 Malaysia project", will need to challenge and generate consensus once 
and for all on the “ethnic fundamentals” of inter-ethnic relations in the country. This must be 
considered as much a challenge as an opportunity. 
16. The Issues
16.1. Language
Perceptions of discrimination and inequitable treatment led to calls for separatism. Most 
upsetting among these was the introduction of a language policy that, whilst maintaining 
segregation in education on the basis of language, privileged those who knew Sinhala with 
regard to state employment as well as dealings with officials.147 This extended later to 
restrictions on educational opportunities based on language distinctions. Though initially 
intended as a means of positive discrimination, implementation was callous, and in one 
instance the system was changed after unfair allegations with regard to Tamil language 
examiners, who were cleared following inquiry. Though measures have been taken to 
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promote equity in development and language policies have been revised, there is still need of 
greater committed concern to ensure equity. 
16.2.  Identity
In order to rectify the above scenario, it is necessary that the State works towards inculcating 
a culture where each citizen becomes an active participant in society and feels a sense of 
belonging and of being Sri Lankan. To this end, the State should make every effort to identify 
and address the social, economic and political structures which caused dissension between 
communities in the first place. 
Further, the Government needs to ensure equitable resource allocation and development 
of villages, bearing in mind that the reverse could lead to frustration and communal tension in 
clusters of villages dominated by different ethnic communities, particularly in the Eastern 
province of the country.   
Moreover, building ownership is critical to safeguard sustainability of initiatives and 
hence every effort should be made to ensure that future development activities are carried out 
in consultation and with the participation of the local people so as to build ownership to the 
development activities, as well as give them a sense of participation in nation building.148
Recognizing that the ensuing minority grievances stem from deficiencies in the system 
of administration and lack of good governance that affect all citizens regardless of ethnicity, 
will guarantee that every citizen who has a grievance out of any executive or administrative 
act, particularly those based on ethnicity or religion, should have the right to seek redress 
before an independent institution. 
16.3.  Public Service
Efforts should be made to make the public service and the police inclusive of all communities 
with special attention to ensuring adequate representation of the population in any area. 
Though this should not depart from the principle of merit based recruitment and promotion, 
positive discrimination may be necessary for a limited period to restore the balance with 
regard to services where currently such balance is lacking. 
To this end, measures should be taken to take further current measures for recruitment 
of Tamil speaking police officers; Recruitment to the police and armed services of Tamils and 
Tamil speaking citizens, with particular attention to officer cadres, should be accelerated.149
Recognizing that an independent permanent Police Commission is a pre-requisite to 
guarantee the effective functioning of the Police and to generate public confidence, the 
Government must make every effort to empower such a Police Commission to monitor the 
performance of the Police Service and ensure that all police officers act independently and 
maintain a high degree of professional conduct.  This will increase the confidence of the 
minorities in the impartiality of the Police. 
                                                          
148
 Salma Yusuf: "Sri Lanka’s tryst with Reconciliation: Where are we today?", Groundviews, 31 January 2013, 
at http://groundviews.org/2013/01/31/sri-lankas-tryst-with-reconciliation-where-are-we-today/. 
149
 "Sweeping Reforms including Senate for Reconciliation", The Sunday Times, 11 March 2012, at 
http://www.sundaytimes.lk/120311/News/nws_04.html; National Policy on Reconciliation, Final Draft, Peace in 
Sri Lanka, August 2012, at http://www.peaceinsrilanka.lk/human-rights/national-policy-on-reconciliation-final-
draft-august-2012. 
UNISCI Discussion Papers, Nº 33 (Octubre / October 2013) ISSN 1696-2206 
217 
16.4. Education
Bearing in mind the significant lapse of time since the introduction of standardization as a 
means of affirmative action by the State to mitigate the imbalance in educational opportunities 
afforded to different communities, it is time that the State, in the best interests of future 
generations undertakes a careful review of this quota system and works towards the 
introduction of a merit-based admissions system. 
Coupled with the above, the Government must actively pursue a programme of 
equitable distribution of educational facilities and make a concerted effort to minimize any 
feeling of discrimination felt by the minorities. Further, the Government should make every 
effort to ensure that the inequality in the availability of educational facilities in different areas 
of the country is reduced and eventually eliminated. 
More importantly, the Government must explicitly and unequivocally convey to the 
public that it strongly discourages disqualifying students on ethnic or religious grounds, in 
respect of admission to schools, as being a significant impediment to reconciliation. 
Additionally, the Government must reinforce its commitment to developing a pro-active 
policy to encourage mixed schools serving children from different ethnic and religious 
backgrounds. Such a policy must be implemented in such a manner so as to facilitate the 
admission of children from different ethnic and religious groups to these schools. 
To make the above a reality, simple measures need to be worked out including 
assurance that at least bilingualism in the public service and other professions serving the 
public is required, whilst nationally the culture of tri-lingualism should be fostered by making 
passes in any two of the National Languages compulsory, along with Mathematics, at the 
GCE Ordinary Level Examination.150
16.5. The Constitution
It is acknowledged that grievances have been exacerbated by a sense of frustration that the 
political process has been hijacked by those in power. This contributed also to two youth 
insurrections in the South of the country, but this sense in the North has been reinforced by 
the absence of political leaders from that area contributing to decision making, with regard 
both to national questions as well as those affecting the regions. 
In addition, it is generally accepted that decision making on many matters cannot be left 
to central government, which is often unaware of the ground situation, and has little political 
incentive to provide swift solutions to problems.151 This makes both devolution with regard to 
policy decisions in certain matters and decentralization to ensure swift responses in most 
areas, a matter of urgency. The ideal therefore is three tiers of government with clear-cut 
responsibilities and systems of accountability, to ensure the best possible service to the 
people.152
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As a matter of urgency therefore, political negotiations should lead to a readjustment of 
the Constitution, to promote empowerment of the people. Whilst some matters, in particular 
those pertaining to national security, interpreted in the broadest sense to ensure financial and 
food and environmental security and so forth in addition to physical security, must be the 
preserve of the Centre, but it is therefore important that the regions too should have a voice in 
decision making in this regard. 
To the end, it has been suggested that the Constitution be amended to provide for a 
Second Chamber of Parliament based on the principle of equal representation for all 
Provinces of the country. 
